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Why I am a Free Will Skeptic: The Free
Will Advocate’s Burden and Pride
Cameron Davis

T

hough philosophers hold strong views about
whether humans have free will and whether free
will is compatible with determinism and mechanism, there is no universal definition of freedom of
the will, perhaps to the detriment of the debate. How free does a
will have to be—what type of freedom must a will have—to appropriately be called a free will? Many answer that a free will is
free enough that the agent can be held morally responsible; having a free will is “just to satisfy the metaphysical requirement of
being responsible for one's action.”1 Yet this definition certainly
would fail to capture the views of others. The existence of semicompatibilists,2 who believe moral responsibility is compatible
with determinism but free will may not be, proves that when
some philosophers discuss freedom of the will, they are employing a definition very different from this one.
Others might answer the definitional question by suggesting that freedom of the will is a property held only by a will
that has all of the sorts of freedom worth caring about. This definition, I believe, is better than the first, yet an even better one can
be given if we answer the question it leaves open: Which sorts of
freedom are worth caring about? Daniel Dennett suggests we
should care only about those sorts of freedom that are not
“incoherently conceived blesssings”—a freedom is meaningful
and worth wanting only if we can conceive of beings with that
freedom in some coherently possible world3 Thus, Dennett says,
“guilty-before-the-eyes-of-God” responsibility,4 the impossible
sort Galen Strawson calls “ultimate moral responsibility,”5 is not
worth caring about. This freedom appears to require an incoherent sort of metaphysical determination of the will not represent-
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ed by determinism, mechanism, agent causation, Kantian libertarianism,6 or any other imaginable metaphysical hypothesis
about the will. On the one hand, just eternal suffering in hell
seems to require that our transgressions aren’t externally caused,
yet it also seems to require that we act for reasons rather than
nonrationally, in which case our reasons presumably would
have some sort of causal—if not necessary—influence on our
wills.7 Because the sort of freedom that grounds ultimate moral
responsibility is incoherent, Dennett would say it is not worth
caring about, so recognizing that we lack this sort of freedom
should not lead us to be free will skeptics. Is he right to assert
this as a general rule?
In this paper, I defend a definition of free will according
to which a will is free if it has all of the sorts of freedom worth
caring about. However, I attempt to refute Dennett’s answer to
the question of which freedoms are worth caring about. I maintain that a freedom can be worth caring about even if it is incoherent, i.e. even if it is not possible to imagine a world in which
humans have it. I argue that Dennett’s condition should be replaced by the following: A type of free will is worth caring about
if (but not only if) one took for granted and cared about this sort
of freedom prereflectively (before reflecting on the philosophical
problems concerning free will). After defending this definition, I
explain why it leads me to identify as a free will skeptic, despite
the fact that I agree almost entirely with compatibilist accounts
of free will like Hilary Bok’s.8 As the reader might suspect, I defend my free will skepticism by arguing that although I possess
many types of freedom worth caring about, I lack a certain type
of freedom I took for granted and cared about prereflectively:
the sort that would justify my feelings of pride in my achievements.
To make this argument, I review what I take to be a particularly strong compatibilist account, Hilary Bok’s “standpoint
compatibilism,”9 and explain why even it cannot completely salvage pride. I also suggest that the freedom required to salvage
pride is incoherent and impossible in the same way that the free-
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dom for ultimate responsibility is. I will not argue that for a rational agent, pride to any extent is impossible but only that pride
to the extent I may have felt it prereflectively is. At the end of the paper, I briefly address a possible Strawson-inspired10 response to
my argument, according to which pride is not to be justified by a
certain metaphysical view of the will but, rather, is a natural response justified by the satisfaction of certain “internal criteria.”11
I: Defense of the All-In Definition of Free Will
Previously I distinguished between the two definitions of
free will. The first I will call the traditional definition. According to
the traditional definition, to say that a will is free is to say that it
satisfies the conditions for moral responsibility. The problem this
definition faces, likely due to its antiquated nature, is a failure to
recognize the scope of the threat imposed on our views about
human agency by reflection upon the metaphysics of the will.
When we reflect on how a will might come to be, it is not only
moral responsibility that is threatened prima facie but other
treasured aspects of our agency. Thus, Thomas Nagel says of a
naturalistic view of human action: “That an account of freedom
can be given which is compatible with the objective view… is not
the case. All such accounts fail to allay the feeling that, looked at
from far enough outside, agents are helpless…”12 Although our
wills are causally efficacious, as free will advocates tend to underscore, we are still mere links in a causal chain, not unconstrained authors of our lives as we imagine and cherish prereflectively. Surely related to this notion of authorship is our pride
in achievements for which we prereflectively take ourselves to be
ultimately responsible.
If we think the types of free will required for ultimate authorship of or pride in our actions are worth caring about (or
even that it is conceivable that free will is worth caring about for
reasons other than the fact that it grounds moral responsibility),
then we should reject the traditional definition of free will. If we
take free will to have a biconditional relationship with moral responsibility, as the traditional definition does, we must think
moral responsibility is so central to who we are as humans that
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no other freedom could conceivably be worth wanting. I find the
traditional definition thus evidently absurd and endorse as its
replacement the all-in definition of free will: We have freedom of
the will if and only if we have all of the sorts of freedom worth
caring about.
II: Which Freedoms are Worth Caring About?
This definition raises a further question: Which types of
freedom are worth caring about? Much as they have done with
the traditional definition of free will, some philosophers have
limited themselves to types of freedom that seem wholly arbitrary. Dennett asserts that we should not care about types of
freedom that are “inconceivable blessings.”13 Upon learning that
we lack a certain kind of freedom, we should only be tempted by
free will skepticism if we can “conceive of beings whose wills
are freer than our own,” Dennett says.14 If Dennett were right,
my argument would fail, for as I will suggest later, the kind of
freedom implied by the pride we prereflectively take in our accomplishments is incoherent and thus inconceivable. However, I
argue that we should reject Dennett’s rule.
Although Dennett remarks throughout his book that certain types of freedom are inconceivable, he never supports his
rule by telling us why we should not care about them. This rule
faces a problem bigger than a lack of argumentative support,
however. Imagine what it would mean in the following hypothetical scenario. If, in some hypothetical world, we one day realized that the freedom required for any form of moral responsibility was impossible—from consequentialist moral responsibility to the expression of reactive attitudes to Galen Strawson’s
ultimate responsibility—Dennett’s rule would require us to still
believe firmly that we had all the free will we needed. This
would be true even if moral responsibility had been as integral
to our interpersonal relationships and societal institutions as it is
in this world. One day we had never thought to question whether these practices so central to our lives were justified; the next
day we realized we were wrong to endorse these “inconceivable
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blessings”; yet Dennett would have us believe that nothing had
been lost—that we still had all of the freedoms worth wanting.
Another absurd consequence of Dennett’s rule is that impossibilism about free will is not even a coherent position; as soon as we
determine a freedom to be impossible, it somehow loses its
meaningfulness and desirability.
Based on the preceding hypothetical scenario, I suggest
the following rule as a replacement: A type of freedom of the
will is worth caring about if (but not only if) one took for granted
and cared about this sort of freedom prereflectively. Even if a
prereflectively cherished freedom of will is, upon philosophical
reflection, incoherent, to still recoil at free will skepticism is to
deceive oneself into the comforting belief that nothing has been
lost—that our increased understanding of the world and of our
minds has not revealed to us that we are not as free as we once
supposed.

III: Our Prereflective Views and Pride
Over the last few hundred years, as scientists and philosophers have come to have a better understanding of our world,
causation, and the will, the truth has often been disconcerting—
at least, at first glance. For the most part, philosophers have focused on the threat to moral responsibility. Some have argued
that because we are mere products of causal history, unable to
deviate from our predetermined course unless by randomness,
many of our moral practices—like praising and blaming ourselves and others for their actions—ought to be called into
doubt,15, 16 and countless others. Later I will argue that moral responsibility is not threatened, but as the rule I have established
dictates, we would be wrong to terminate our inquiry here. Our
wills might thankfully be free enough for moral responsibility,
yet the modern understanding of causation and of our wills may
still reveal to us a loss of something substantive.
My prereflective view of my choices is one strikingly at
odds with every reasoned, careful view that I can conceive of my
will. My first-person, introspective experience was almost unquestionable evidence that I had unconstrained control as the
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ultimate author of my life. My choices were things I made—as
they still are even in light of this new understanding—but they
were not also things that happened to me. Never did I imagine my
actions could be fully explained as products of the remote past
before I was born and the laws of nature17—that though my
choices are causally efficacious, and my past choices can cause
my future choices, they are all “the necessary result of the state
of the universe… say, at a moment in the Cretaceous period…”18
As long as we imagine that the will is caused with some probability by neural events, no admission of indeterminacy will bring
the modern view in line with my prereflective one. The suggestion that my actions are entirely products of the remote past before I was born, the laws of nature, and randomness is no more
comforting. Perhaps I—i.e. whatever metaphysically mysterious
entity can appropriately be called my self—cause my choices,
and my causing my choices is itself uncaused, so that we need
not trace my choices to things external to me.19, 20
If we circumvent this problem common to event-causal
views, however, we only trade one problem for another. Prereflectively, and still now, I am so sure that I act for reasons—that I
will choose whichever alternative I believe I have most reason to
choose—but my ordering of alternatives must be causally determined. As long as my choices are intelligible in terms of character traits I have and reasons I find compelling, my choices will
have external causes, and I will lose the ultimate authorship I
believed in prereflectively. However, I have not yet explained
why the freedom implied by ultimate authorship is worth caring
about. If we are to be free will skeptics on the grounds that we
lack the freedom for ultimate authorship, we first ought to establish why this is a meaningful freedom, a task to which I now
turn.
Some might consider pride an ignoble thing to care about.
I, on the other hand, will insist that pride is something we tend
to care about immensely and is rather important to a well-lived
life. In order to do this and dispel any misconceptions the reader
might have, I think it will be most useful to precisely character-
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ize the kind of pride I have in mind. By pride, I mean roughly
what the first definition of in the New Oxford American Dictionary describes: “a feeling or deep pleasure or satisfaction derived
from one's own achievements.” For me, however, pride does not
entail what is described by this same dictionary’s third definition, the definition responsible for pride’s negative connotation:
The pride to which I refer is not “the quality of having an excessively high opinion of oneself or one's importance”; it is not vanity, nor is it ostentatiousness. It is not the sort of self-centered concern with one’s achievements that would motivate him to ignore
his duties to others in pursuit of his own interests. This pride is
merely the satisfaction one derives from feeling accomplished
and exceptional. If I perform exceptionally on an exam, become a
very successful business owner after years of hard work, or am
admitted to an excellent graduate program, I feel pride not because this achievement is a step toward a better future but simply because I find satisfaction in my being exceptional in itself.
I hope that at this point, the reader agrees that this sort of
pride in one’s achievements is, for most of us, very important to
a well-lived life. Perhaps the most admirable of those among us
are driven to succeed in their hobbies, academic pursuits, and
careers only because this success is a means to some other end
like helping others, providing for those they care about, or building the sorts of futures and lives they want to have. However,
most are motivated to a considerable extent to succeed by a desire for the feeling of pride—because we want to feel as though
we are excellent at whatever it is we enjoy. Though pride may be
far from the most important part of lives, if the modern understanding of causation and of our wills were to take it from us, it
would be absurd to suggest that nothing substantive had been
lost.
Prereflectively, I never questioned the rationality of feeling pride. I believed that somehow, I acted for reasons, yet my
decisions and my efforts were not caused, instead originating
largely within me. A wise decision to stay up late working on a
project or good performance on an exam could be traced back
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along the causal chain to me—as they still can in light of the
modern understanding—but no further, and certainly not to the
beginning of time or the occurrence of a random event. If they
could, they would appear, though largely attributable to my
character, to be matters of luck—of having been “dealt a good
hand”— since they are ultimately products of factors outside of
my control. Free will advocates have argued extensively that this
does not threaten our freedom of will, but I will argue that they
have been successful only in salvaging the freedom required for
moral responsibility—not that required for our feelings of pride.
To do this, I examine Bok’s account of freedom and responsibility as the compatibilist account with the most promise.
IV: Where Free Will Adovcates Have Suceeded:
Responsibility and Blame
Bok’s account is often called standpoint compatibilism because it takes freedom of the will to arise naturally from the
standpoint of practical deliberation.21 Bok argues that when we
are engaged in practical deliberation, it is both unavoidable and
rational to regard as possible courses of action not solely what
we will be caused by natural laws to do but also all of those alternatives we would do if we chose to do them.22 Some actions
may not be among my alternatives because they are beneath
consideration or impossible, e.g. traveling to the moon.23 Nevertheless, because while an agent deliberates “it is impossible…for
her to predict the outcome of her choice…” from the practical
standpoint she has reason to regard herself as free to do any action she would perform if she chose it.24 At this point, the incompatibilist may wonder how this seemingly superficial freedom
could be sufficiently robust to justify moral responsibility; it
seems one’s will is free solely due to one’s epistemically limited
standpoint. Bok’s answer is simple but compelling.
The freedom that arises from the practical standpoint is
exactly the kind necessary for moral evaluation, blame, and improvement.25 When we are engaged in practical reasoning, Bok
explains, we must employ “some conception of the kinds of actions we wish to perform or to avoid, the kinds of persons we
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wish to be, the kinds of characteristics we wish to have or to
avoid having, and so forth.”26 “The collection of considerations
that an agent regards as giving rise to reasons for action” Bok
calls the agent’s “standards.”27 Anyone who engages in practical
reasoning as means of governing his behavior, whether his
standards are those of a moral saint or of a “world-class terrorist,” must believe he ought to do everything he can to live up to
those standards, for the better he lives up to his standards the
closer he is to the person he ideally wishes to be. We do not
translate our standards into action with perfect reliability, however. “Our character affects the extent to which we live up to our
standards of conduct, and the extent to which we perform those
acts that, if asked, we would claim that we have most reason to
perform… If I lack the confidence to act on my own judgments
when others disagree with me, or the strength to resist what I
take to be temptations, then I will often fail to act as I think I
should,” Bok explains.28 Because any person who engages in
practical reasoning has both standards and a character, she has,
“in virtue of that fact, an interest in improving her character.”29
From this fact also arises the need for and justification of
blame. If an outcome that is, according to my standards, suboptimal issues from one of my character traits, I have reason to blame
myself for that outcome. If my character had been different, this
outcome would not have occurred, and I would have lived up to
my standards. As Bok says, “The fact that I failed to do something that I could have done [in the sense of could relevant to the
practical standpoint] and should have done…must reflect something about me; and therefore any point at which I failed to apply my standards correctly must reveal some flaw in my character that I have reason to try to correct.”30 Guilt for my transgressions is a natural occurrence, Bok says, because I care deeply that
the world comes into line with my standards and I recognize that
it is because of my character, over which I have practical control,
that in this instance it did not.31 On the other hand, when I live
up to my standards, I have reason to praise myself and find satisfaction in the fact that I have the kind of character that allows me
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to live and do as I think best. For responsibility and blame, the
fact that I can trace along the causal chain from my transgressions all of the way to events in the remote past and thus beyond
my control is irrelevant; as long as the causal chain does pass
through my character, a point at which my choices to improve
my character can make a difference, I have reason to hold myself
responsible. Bok’s account is very successful in salvaging moral
responsibility, but is pride thus salvaged as well? I will argue
that it is not.
V: Where Free Will Advocates Have Failed: Pride
In the last section, I said that on Bok’s account, if I live up
to my standards, I have reason to praise myself and find satisfaction in the fact that I have the kind of character that allows me to
live and do as I think best. It might seem at first that Bok has salvaged pride or something very similar, for what this describes is
a feeling of satisfaction derived from the recognition that one is
living in the way he takes to be most successful. However, this
feeling is in reality not the sort of pride I described earlier. When
one derives satisfaction from the fact that he is able to live up to
his standards, it is because he cares deeply that the world comes
into line with those standards; this is not the same as pride, a
satisfaction derived from the fact that one feels ultimately responsible for his excellence. Let us take for example an agent
whose standards tell him it is best to meet those who are mean
to him with kindness. He will be satisfied when he has the character that allows him to do this consistently because he cares
deeply that mean people are treated with kindness, and he recognizes that in shaping the good character he now has, he has
done all he can do to promote these good outcomes. This feeling
of satisfaction is very distinct from a feeling of pride, which I
take to be a feeling of satisfaction with one’s own achievement.
The former type of satisfaction stems from the obtainment of
what one cares about, whereas the latter is a satisfaction with
one’s own excellence, for which, I suggest, one feels ultimately
responsible.
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Bok’s account shows that we are responsible for our actions in virtue of our ability to improve our characters, but it
cannot show that we are ultimately responsible for our characters themselves. It is my character that leads to my academic
achievements, for example. To what extent can I feel pride in
these? The answer depends on how thoughtfully I reflect on the
modern understanding; on the fact that my character is not selfcreated and it as well as my achievements can be fully explained
as products of things completely outside of my control; and on
the fact that while my achievements are things I do, they are also
things that happen to me. When I attend to these facts, I feel significantly less pride than when I do not. Perhaps we could say
that when I choose not to attend to these facts so that I can feel
pride, I deceive myself by ignoring facts that upon careful reflection would change my views; I shield myself from the ugly
truth. Can we really say that the modern understanding has not
revealed to us any significant loss if I have to ignore certain facts
to feel pride to the extent I once felt it? The modern understanding has revealed to me that I lack what I take to be a rather important freedom: the freedom of will required to rationally—upon
rational reflection—feel the pride I did in my prereflective stage. It
is worse than this, however. Even when I do not actively reflect
upon this newfound understanding, I now feel significantly less
pride than I did prereflectively. The recognition of how my will
really comes to be affects my conception of my successes even
when I divert my focus.
At this point the reader may offer a response in the spirit
of P.F. Strawson’s Freedom and Resentment.32 Could pride, like
resentment and gratitude, be a feeling immune to the sort of rational scrutiny to which I have subjected it? If resentment is a
natural response to ill will to be justified by the truth of its propositional content—that someone really has demonstrated malicious intent—rather than by a metaphysical picture of the will,
perhaps pride is similarly justified only by some “internal criteria”33 such as one’s actually having achieved something.
Whether this response works, I suggest, may differ from
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person to person. It is a question to be answered by one’s own
experience. I admit that if one feels the utmost pride simply in
virtue of the fact that he has achieved, despite that achievement’s causal origins, then he does not have good reason to call
himself a free will skeptic. Though the modern understanding
has revealed to him that he is not the ultimate author of his life,
it has not revealed an unfreedom worth caring about. However,
drawing upon my personal experience, I can say that this Strawsonian response fails in at least some cases. For those whose rational reflection on their freedoms and unfreedoms of the will
strips from them a feeling they once took for granted and cared
about deeply, we cannot say the type of freedom they now realize they lack is unimportant. With these particular cases in mind,
we must acknowledge that if we accept the all-in definition of
free will, we cannot say that free will and any sort of metaphysical hypothesis about the will are objectively compatible.

VI: Closing Thoughts
I call myself a free will skeptic not because the modern
understanding has revealed to me that meaningful agency was
only a delusion. Compatibilists have been extremely successful
in salvaging some of the most important aspects of our agency:
the possibility of deliberation; the significance of deliberation
and efficacy of the will; and many of the most common forms of
moral responsibility. Nor do I call myself a free will skeptic because I no longer feel any pride at all. Because pride is rooted in
humans’ psychological nature, remnants remain even after rational scrutiny has done its best. I cannot deny, however, that
this rational scrutiny has taken a significant toll on something I
once took for granted and cared about deeply. When I call myself a free will skeptic, I am not supposing that the modern view
of my will has shown me to be dismally unfree. I have many of
the important freedoms of will that make human agency special.
But when I say that I am a free will skeptic, I acknowledge that
this new way of understanding my character, my actions, and
my accomplishments has led me to a undeniably regrettable re-
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alization: Something I took for granted and cared deeply about
in my prereflective stage is now gone, and I am not as free as I
once unquestioningly supposed myself to be.
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